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ABSTRACT 
This paper summarizes the essentials of an investigation conducted by the authors to test conflicting 
scenarios regarding the cause and origin of an accidental fire. Fire investigators proposed that an 
underbody fuel-leak ignited while the vehicle was in motion and transferred sufficient heat through 
the steel floor to cause rapid, but undetectable, ignition and fire growth in the interior of the vehicle. 
To assess the feasibility of the proposed scenario, a series of experiments were designed together with 
the development of a priori modeling studies. The transient heating across the vehicle floor was 
modeled, which allowed determining the characteristics for fire ignition inside the vehicle depending 
on the scenario studied. The post-ignition regime was studied using computational fire modeling to 
obtain an approximate time for smoke detection by the passengers. Results from these models 
provided input to the design of experimental tests with a real-scale vehicle under a forced flow 
imitating driving conditions. The tests showed that the only situation for which the scenario was 
feasible was for the condition where unexpected perforations existed in the floor pan. In the case 
where the floor pan did not contain perforations (as in the subject accident vehicle), heat transfer from 




The role of a fire investigator is to interpret the evidence at the fire scene to identify the 
probable situations and conditions under which the fire might have occurred. In general 
terms, the identification of the origin, the ignition source, and the spread rate can ultimately 
lead to the development of several plausible time-lines of the fire development. Maybe, some 
more probable than others. By correlating the available witness accounts to the timelines and 
the application of models and experimental testing, it is often possible to converge on a 
smaller set of scenarios, or maybe a sole scenario, agreeing well with the evidence. Reports of 
investigations of accidental fires are rarely available compared to the high volume of them 
conducted yearly on a global scale. This fact is unfortunate because much of this work could 
be used to feed new knowledge back into the scientific community for the benefit of all. 
Accident investigation is an essential part of the development of the Fire Safety Engineering 
discipline and provides a means of improving our understanding of the subject [1]. 
Information extracted from accidents, failures and past events leads to greater 
understanding, improved engineering designs and enhanced safety. 
This paper presents the investigation conducted by the authors to test conflicting scenarios 
regarding the cause and origin of an accidental fire. This tragic fire (Fig. 1) occurred in a 
moving mini van, after 5 to 6 min of driving, and resulted in the death of three passengers, 
injuries to the surviving passenger and the driver and the complete loss of the vehicle. The 
initial fire investigators proposed that the fuel source was a fuel spray released from a 
degraded supply or return line next to exhaust components under the vehicle. Supposedly, 
the resultant flame exposed the rear floor pan of the vehicle to intense heat transfer resulting 
in the ignition of interior materials, and the subsequent fire burned out the vehicle interior. 
Allegedly, interior materials were ignited while the vehicle was traveling at moderate city 
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speed and without enough warning to the occupants. However, this assumed scenario is not 
supported by the accounts of the main witness, who report no pre-fire indicators such as 
odors, smoke, irritating gasses or buildup of heat by any of the occupants. The driver 
describes the event as being a sudden conical plume of white smoke at the rear of the van, 
followed shortly thereafter by rapid fire growth. She was immediately alerted of the plume 
because she heard a “pop”, and one of the passengers said “what’s that?”. The driver 
immediately stopped, ran around the back and opened the right side-sliding door and was 
able to remove one child from the middle row of seats. The driver attempted to re-enter, but 
could not because the interior of the van was filled with flames and smoke. Three passengers 
were unable to exit and perished in the fire. The driver’s description of the fire spread 
suggests dramatically fast time-line. 
 
 
Figure 1. Vehicle testing site (right) and the post fire remains of the real case (left). 
Our investigation aims at deciding which of the following two hypothetical scenarios is the 
most probable cause of the fire: 
• Hypothesis of an external source: Underbody fuel-spray fire while the vehicle was 
moving at moderate speed. 
• Hypothesis of an internal source: Rapid ignition of flammable gas cloud. 
To assess which hypothetical scenario best matches the evidence and witness accounts, the 
investigation uses modeling and a series of experiments. The majority of work reported in 
this paper pertains to the analysis of the external ignition hypothesis and its feasibility. 
MOTOR VEHICLE FIRES 
Automobile fires belong to the more general class of fires in transportation systems, which 
include trucks, buses, trains, subways and airplanes and has been reviewed in [2]. Tewarson 
[3] examined the flammability of plastic vehicle components and parts, by subjecting them to 
ignition and burn tests. Santrock and Kononen [4] examined the ignition properties of typical 
automobile fluids other than the engine fuel (motor oil, lubricants, transmission fluid). 
Most vehicle fires occur immediately after a crash. However, statistics show that the vehicles 
burned in fires of parking structures is a significant figure. This is due to the high density of 
parked vehicle resulting in a high number of them being exposed to the flames in any single 
event. Fire safety in vehicles puts attention on leakages from the fuel tank, filler pipes, and 
connections during and after crashes, as well as the flammability of the materials used in the 
vehicle, especially for the passenger’s compartment.  
After a crash, the usual first fuel to burn is the flammable liquid released accidentally. 
Typical ignition sources include hot manifolds in the engine compartment; electrical arcs and 
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short circuits in the electrical system; and friction sparks. Gaps and opened seams produced 
in a crash allow for the penetration inside the vehicle by the flames from an external fire 
(typically flames in the underbody). However, in the absence of a crash, the only 
manufacturing openings connecting the underbody fire with the inside of the compartment 
are drain holes in the floor board and similar features. An exemplar timeline for the fire 
development in a staged post-crash vehicle can be found in [5], which reports results from 
exposing a passenger car to a 16-liter underbody spill fire. The test showed the following 
sequence of events: fire penetration to the passenger compartment in about 10 s; 
compartment full of smoke in 45 s; gasoline pool burn-out in 60 s; substantial flame spread 
inside the vehicle in 150 s; smoke incapacitation of the passengers in 200 s. 
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS 
The case investigated in this work corresponds to a rare event in that the compartment fire 
occurred in a moving vehicle, driving normally and not involved in any crash. Thus, both 
internal and external ignition-sources were considered as hypothetical scenarios. For the 
hypothesis of an external source, the primary element of analysis is to study the process of 
fire propagation to the interior of the vehicle. Once a fire is initiated in the interior, the 
abundance of combustible material in the confined space of a passenger’s compartment 
(carpet, head liners, seat, etc) promotes rapid flame spread. In events where the fire is 
initially located outside of the vehicle’s enclosure, there are two situations that can lead to 
the ignition of the interior: 
• Piloted ignition: the enclosure has some openings, which allow the external fire to ignite 
interior materials. 
• Auto ignition: heat transfer through the enclosure boundary surface (traditionally steel 
structure) is sufficient to ignite the interior material. 
The case investigation was conducted in three major phases: 
1. Review and correlation of accident data including official accident site photographs, 
witness accounts, collection and documentation of evidence and survey of pertinent 
literature. A summary of these data is collected in Table 1, which details parameters of 
the vehicle, the situation of the accident, description of the event and a summary of 
essential evidence. 
2. Modeling to assess the heat transfer of a flame in the underside of a steel surface with a 
50 km/h air flow and potential ignition of the floor-covering materials. Enclosure fire 
modeling to predict smoke and fire growth characteristics inside of the vehicle passenger 
compartment and to help in the placement of sensors during the full-scale tests. 
3. Physical testing of three scenarios to assess their validity to explain the evidence, and to 
compare the results with the prediction of the modeling. 
 
FIRE MODELING 
Two modeling studies were performed before the experimental series was initiated. First, an 
analysis of the heat transfer from an underbody flame through the floor structure to the 
interior flooring materials, and then a model of the fire development inside the passenger’s 
compartment. Modeling and theoretical analysis should be used a priori to design the 
experiments and a posteriori to help in the interpretation of the results. 
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Thermal Modeling  
The transient heating of the floor from the exterior (Fig. 2, left) by a flame on the bottom was 
modeled to allow calculating the approximate ignition times of the floor-covering materials 
inside the vehicle. The goal was to assess both the auto ignition and the piloted ignition. 
The heat to the floor is conducted along the slab and lost to the surrounding air. 
Mathematically, this was modeled as transient heat transfer by conduction in an infinite slab 
heated from both sides, assuming radial symmetry (Eq. 1). The heat exchange from the flame 
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Figure 2. Schematic of the floor heated from below in the thermal model 
The layered floor (carpet, acrylic and steel) was treated as one layer 2.5-cm thick (according 
to the manufacturer notes) and with weighted properties taken from [6]. The carpet is 
modeled a 10 mm thick layer of PP+PE. The polyacrylic layer is 12 mm thick and the steel 
plate of 2 mm. The flame temperature fT  was assumed to be 900 °C, the emissivity ε  to 0.9, 
the flame radius fr  to 10 cm, the convective heat transfer inside the van ih  to 7 W/mK, and 
the convective heat transfer outside 0h  (air velocity of 50 km/h) was set to 55 W/mK. 
 
The results (Fig. 2, right) show that the center of hot spot heats up at an initial rate of about 
130 °C/min. The heating slows down significantly after reaching 300 °C and reaches steady 
state temperature (450 °C) after about 600 s. A typical auto-ignition temperature for carpet 
material is about 600 °C [1], so the calculations predict that auto ignition of the floor-covering 
will not take place. If a pilot source is present in the vicinity (holes in the floor) and assuming 
a piloted ignition temperature of carpet of 400 °C [1], ignition would occur 380 s after flame 
exposure started. These results are later compared to experimentally measured temperature 
profiles (Figs. 5 and 6). 
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• An approx. 8-year old luxury mini-van outfitted for comfort and utility which had traveled 170,000 
km. Aftermarket interior. AC and heating system for front and rear passenger areas. 
• Gasoline engine. Deteriorated exhaust system: tail pipe missing, muffler riddled with holes, 
episodes of engine misfire. Catalytic converter OK. 
Event Line 
(local time) 
Events or Description 
Evening before 
the fire 
• Van traveled recently over 240 km and driver stated that vehicle performed 
excellently. 
• Vehicle was parked overnight in the driveway outside. 








• Loaded children in car and left house at about 13:30. 
• Traveling on city roadways; several stop signs and stop lights. 
• Vehicle performance got progressively poorer and decided to return home. 
• At about 13:36, the driver hears a report (“pop” or hissing sound). 
• Child in back seat says “what’s that?!”. 
• Driver observes a conical plume of “dense white smoke” from behind the middle 






• Driver immediately pulls off road to right side. 
• Van appears to be full of smoke; then fire. 
• Exits by driver door, runs around back of van. 
• Opens right side sliding door and removes child from the right seat of the middle 
row. 
• Passenger compartment full of smoke and hot gas during this procedure; head 
liner melting and dripping. 
• Rapid fire spread from rear along headliner. 
• Unable to re-enter van to extract the other children, hair singed, hands burned. 
After the fire 
• No fire or spilled fuel under van while witnesses assisting driver or when first 
responders arrive. 
• Van interior totally involved in fire. 
• No fire suppression for 15 min 
Fire damage to van 
• Interior complete burn-out. All windows broken. Buckling of steel roof. 
• Engine compartment damage is lower than in passenger compartment. 
• Rear tires severely burned. Front tires burned noticeably less than rear tires 
• Spare tire mounted to underside rear floor pan degraded at interface to floor pan 
• Fuel-tank shield made of polymer is partially melted from top down. 
• Underbody polymeric materials that were not close to floor pan exhibit minimal heat effect (except 
for those close to the burning rear tires) 
• Survey of debris in the rear of the van compartment include: melted aluminum, jack and jack 
handle, chard remains of various carpet samples, and other unidentified materials and objects. 
• No open penetrations in the passenger compartment floor pan. 
Table 1. Summary of background information 
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Figure 3. Analytical results of temperature in the space vs. time domain in the thermal model 
 
 
Post ignition and early fire growth 
The post ignition regime was studied using FDS [7] to provide estimations of the early fire 
environment. The objective is to have rough estimates of the time-line of the thermal and 
smoke environment in the passenger’s compartment. In the small space of the passenger’s 
compartment of a vehicle, the first indicators of ignition are smoke (smell, sight) and heat. 
Both are readably perceived by occupants and warn in early times of the impending danger. 
When these pre-fire indicators are perceived, passengers will have a much greater chance of 
escaping on time before flames spread inside of vehicle. For the following results, both the 
external and internal ignition hypotheses are studied by the same scenario since the 
assumptions are essentially the same. 
A very simple and approximate study of heat and mass propagation in the interior on the 
vehicle was conducted with FDS [7]. The domain is set roughly to the interior of the vehicle 
following Fig. 4. The fuel is assumed to be PS using the 2004 FDS database values. The time 
line is initiated at the instant of flaming ignition, regardless of how, and the fire growth is 
assumed to be a slow t2-fire [8]. The simulation results are used to estimate approximately 
the time to fire detection by the driver due to smoke and irritant combustion gases (less than 
25 s) or heat. (less than 30 s). The thresholds for detection were set at high values to ensure 
that the calculated times are an overestimation. For smoke irritation the threshold is 500 
mg/m3, and for a 5 °C for the gas temperature increase. The pyrolyzates produced by 
materials decomposition during the pre-ignition heating regime is not accounted for in the 
FDS model. Adding this into the analysis is expected to lead to faster detection times. The 
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simulations estimate that the passengers’ compartment is filled with smoke at about 80 s 
after flame ignition in the interior. 
Both modeling results indicate that an approximated time line in the case of an external 
source will be of 380 s for ignition of the interior carpet and less than 25 s after ignition for 
detection of the fire by the passengers. This time line is far from matching the time line 
described by the witnesses.  
 
SMALL- AND FULL-SCALE EXPERIMENTS 
Small-Scale Tests 
Preliminary tests were conducted to decide on the spray apparatus and flow rate that will be 
used in the experiments to represent the external and the internal fire sources. 
For the external fire, it was decided to have the fire source imitating a leak in a pressurized 
fuel-line. Thus, a gasoline spray-nozzle connected to a reservoir containing a standard fuel 
pump was ignited and tested at several flow rates, from 100 ml/min to 300 ml/min. In order 
to obtain a flame size big enough and to avoid spay rates forming a pool fire on the ground 
below the vehicle, it was determined that 215 ml/min flow rate would be used in the full-
scale tests. This value is in agreement with the spray fire of 200 ml/min used in under-hood 
tests conducted by NIST and GM [9]. Gasoline sprayed at this rate produces approximately a 
100 kW fire. 
For the internal fire source, tests were conducted to evaluate a fire initiated from a 
pressurized small can of WD-40 (hydrocarbon-based oil, 74 ml capacity), which is a USA 
commercial product for automobile maintenance. In order to test the system to recreate the 
proposed internal fire scenario, the WD-40 aerosol was release inside a drum (imitating a 
small close space). Prior to ignition, the released aerosol produced a distinct white plume. 
The spray was calibrated and it was determined that the best released was to empty the can 
in 7 s. This results in a flow of 10 ml/s and an approximated heat released rate of 2.5 kW 
(using the heat of combustion of light petroleum base oil). 
 
Full-Scale Testing 
Two full-scale tests were conducted to evaluate the hypothesis of an external source, using 
an underbody spray-fire during replicated driving conditions (see right of Fig.1). The first 
test had the floor pan of the vehicle with penetrations (piloted ignition scenario) and the 
second had no penetrations (auto-ignition scenario). A third test was conducted to evaluate 
the hypothesis of an internal source and fire growth in the passenger compartment was 
studied after ignition of an aerosol plume from a pressurized container located behind the 
back seats. 
 
In preparation for these tests a platform was constructed, where the vehicle was situated 
approximately 60 cm above the ground. A photograph of the vehicle on the test platform is 
shown in right side image of Fig. 1. The front of the platform was ramped down to the 
ground at an approximate 30° angle to help direct airflow under the van. A large fan 
designed for wind tunnel applications was used to simulate the air flow that would develop 
around and under the van when it was being driven. The fan was located at a distance of 1.2 
m in front of the van and adjusted to develop winds consistent with the real scenario. Due to 
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the complex geometry under the van (axles, fuel tank, exhaust, suspension) the slip-stream 
wind speed under the van varied between 20 and 70 km/h. 
 
 
Figure 4. Location of thermocouples inside the vehicle for the full scale tests. 
Each test was instrumented using thermocouples and video cameras. Fig. 4 is a schematic of 
the test set-up showing location of the measurement locations. The instruments were placed 
at selected locations throughout the inside and outside of the vehicle, with more 
measurement points right above the area of fire impingement (note vertical rake with 
thermocouple at the rear). Results from the FDS model were used to help determine the best 
location of the thermocouples and the video cameras. A thermocouple in front of the nozzle 
recorded flame duration and ambient conditions were also recorded. Gas measurements of 
the interior atmosphere at the driver position were taken during each test using acetaldehyde 
and acrolein sensitive Dreager tubes. The threshold detection level of these tubes was 10 
ppm. These measurements were made to see if these common irritant gasses, produced 
during degradation of plastic materials, could alerting the passengers to the impending fire. 
The spray nozzle was located under the van next to the alleged degraded fuel line. The 
nozzle was pointed so that the center of the spray pattern contacted the under floor pan aft of 
the rear axle. There was only one exemplar van of this vintage available for the tests. 
Consequently, we needed to be frugal with the floor covering materials, the head liner and 
the seats so that we had enough virgin materials to conduct three tests. Thus the termination 
requirement for all but the last test was to stop the experiment when flames spread to the 
N Alvares, K Staggs, G Rein, Investigation of a Fatal Fire in a Moving Vehicle, Proceedings of 
the 5th International Seminar on Fire and Explosion Hazards, pp. 800-809, Edinburgh, 2007. 
Presentation slides available at http://www.see.ed.ac.uk/feh5 
 
9 
headliner. Termination of the test was accomplished by use of a high capacity CO2 
extinguisher piped directly into the passenger compartment. 
External Fire - Piloted ignition scenario: Fig. 5 shows the temperature measurements in the 
passenger compartment for the test where penetrations were present in the floor pan. At t=0, 
the spray-fire was initiated under the van and the temperature of the floor-covering material 
started to increase after 40 s. Piloted ignition occurred approximately after 210 s, and it is 
seen in Fig. 5 as the temperature of below the rake location reached 400 °C. Temperature rise 
at the ceiling thermocouples (‘rake top’) is first sensed at about 170 s after spray-fire 
initiation, and flames reached the height of the head liner at about 230 s when the fire was 
manually extinguished. Video records showed visual evidence of smoke at the back of the 
van approximately 120 s after spray-fire initiation and 80 s before fire reached the headliner 
in the test with floor pan penetrations. Both acetaldehyde and acrolein were detected inside 
the compartment before the tests was terminated. Comparison with the results from the 
ignition model of Eqs. (1) and (2) shows good agreement. Translating the time zero of the 
heat transfer model results to the first measured temperature increase (t=40 s). When flames 
penetrate the compartment at 210 s, the model predicted temperatures of 350°C, which 
compares well with the 400°C measured below the rake. The affected carpet material was 
replaced after this experiment to allow the next large-scale experiment. 
External Fire - Auto ignition scenario: Fig. 6 shows the temperature measurements in the 
compartment for the test where there were no penetrations in the floor pan. Significant 
heating of the steel floor is starts at 70 s and the subsequent rise is very similar to that in the 
previous test since the outside spray-fire and air flow conditions were the same. However, 
there is no fire ignition in the compartment in more than 500 s. Smoke was visible at 230 s at 
the back of the van for the test where there were no floor pan penetrations – filling the van 
and becoming progressively denser until the test was terminated. Thermocouples inside the 
compartment show essentially no temperature rise. The heating of the floor caused extensive 
thermal degradation of the floor-covering materials in a radius of about 0.5 m around the 
flame impingement point but were not high enough to cause spontaneous ignition. This time 
line correlates well with camera recordings of the experiment. Both acetaldehyde and 
acrolein were detected inside the compartment before the tests was terminated. In order to 
test the effect of the external airflow, at 300 s the air fan was shut down. Thus, external 
convective heat-losses were substantially reduced and the effect in the steel floor is 
immediate, showing at sudden rise of 40°C at 300 s (see thermocouple ‘below rake forward’ 
in Fig. 6). For this experiment both acetaldehyde and acrolein were also detected inside the 
compartment before the tests was terminated.  
Comparison with the results from the ignition model of Eqs. (1) and (2) shows very good 
agreement. It is seen the heating curves are the same and predictions are within the expected 
experimental error range (±5 %). The comparison in this test is even better than for the 
previous one because the model assumptions do not contemplate the effect of the 
penetrations in the floor-pan.  
Sudden Internal Fire: Test results from a rapid cloud fire located behind the rear seat of the 
van are nearly identical to the gas temperature measured in Fig. 5 at t=240 s when flaming 
ignition took place. Flame propagation took place rapidly and acetaldehyde and acrolein 
were not detected inside the compartment in the short time of the experiment. 
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Figure 5. Under-floor spray test: penetrations at flame impingement site. 
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Figure 6. Under floor spray test: no penetration at flame impingement site. 
Temperature records and heat transfer modeling results. 
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Experimental and modeling investigations of an accidental fire have been conducted. The fire 
scenario proposed by the initial fire investigators – a spray fire under the moving vehicle 
igniting interior materials - posed an unusual case for study. Results from both the heat 
transfer model and the test, where there were no penetrations in the floor pan at the spray 
fire impingement site, prove that the scenario proposed by the investigators was flawed 
because it would not match the evidence and the time line described by the witnesses. If in 
fact, a spray fire occurred below the van, there would have been more than enough time for 
the driver to have stopped and evacuate all of the passengers before fire could spread to the 
interior space. Even the condition where penetrations existed in the floor pan would, 
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